Writing during the first break in the hearing.
I’m trying to listen with an open mind to Petraeus and Crocker. It’s hard, probably impossible, when the main substance of their presentations have been known in advance, and have been debunked in advance by critics who have become more and more sure-footed by years of experience and more and more convincing by years of turning out to be right.
For example, if I understand correctly, after the token withdrawal of one of the 20 combat brigades in December, Gen. Petraeus suggests (no guarantees) that by next summer, the total U.S. force might be down to 15 brigades, which I understand to be the level of U.S. forces before the surge began. The possibility of further reductions is mentioned without even target dates.
One problem: We have been told repeatedly that the full surge cannot be sustained beyond next spring without “breaking” the U.S. military. Is Petraeus simply claiming that the withdrawal that will forced by events will be made possible by future successes that he can’t guarantee?
Surmise: It’s really too late for anyone speaking for this administration to claim to see a light at the end of the tunnel. It’s possible that these two are right, and the light is there.
But to me, the only evidence of serious forward progress would be sustained declines across several months in the total amount of violence in Iraq, the total deaths, both U.S. troops and Iraqi civilians, and sustained improvement in the Iraqi economy, and it would have to be measured by neutral, non-administration officials using the most straightforward, transparent and verifiable methods.
Short of that, my gut feeling is that the long-awaited Petraeus-Crocker moment leaves us where we were, with Pres. Bush planning to sustain high troop levels, in the combat zones, and vowing to veto anything that deviates from that. Dems, lacking any hope of overriding a veto, lacking the willingness to cut off funds, hope it will be the issue that puts them in control of the executive and legislative branches in 2009.
And if that happens, and if the U.S. withdraws or substantially reduces its presence sometime in 2009, we will begin to the learn the answer to the most unknowable of questions, which is whether that will turn out to be one more disaster, for the Iraqis and perhaps for the United States, to follow the ones we have seen so far.
Cross-posted at Minnesota Monitor.

